76 135. Once it has been proved that land restitution rights are still current, the State must take the necessary actions to return them to the members of the indigenous people claiming them. However, as the Court has pointed out, when a State is unable, on objective and reasoned grounds, to adopt measures aimed at returning traditional lands and communal resources to indigenous populations, it must surrender alternative lands of equal extension and quality, which will be chosen by agreement with the members of the indigenous peoples, according to their own consultation and decision procedures.199 136. Nevertheless, the Court can not to decide that Sawhoyamaxa Community’s property rights to traditional lands prevail over the right to property of private owners or vice versa, since the Court is not a domestic judicial authority with jurisdiction to decide disputes among private parties. This power is vested exclusively in the Paraguayan State. Nevertheless, the Court has competence to analyze whether the State ensured the human rights of the members of the Sawhoyamaxa Community. 137. Following this line of thought, the Court has ascertained that the arguments put forth by the State to justify non-enforcement of the indigenous people's property rights have not sufficed to release it from international responsibility. The State has put forth three arguments: 1) that claimed lands have been conveyed from one owner to another “for a long time” and are duly registered; 2) that said lands are being been adequately exploited, and 3) that the owner’s right “is protected under a bilateral agreement between Paraguay and Germany[,] which […] has become part of the law of the land.” 138. Regarding the first argument, the Court considers that the fact that the claimed lands are privately held by third parties is not in itself an “objective and reasoned” ground for dismissing prima facie the claims by the Indigenous people. Otherwise, restitution rights become meaningless and would not entail an actual possibility of recovering traditional lands, as it would be exclusively limited to an expectation on the will of the current holders, forcing indigenous communities to accept alternative lands or economic compensations. In this respect, the Court has pointed out that, when there be conflicting interests in indigenous claims, it must assess in each case the legality, necessity, proportionality and fulfillment of a lawful purpose in a democratic society (public purposes and public benefit), to impose restrictions on the right to property, on the one hand, or the right to traditional lands, on the other. The contents of each parameter have been defined by the Court in the Case of the Indigenous Community Yakye Axa, hence express reference to said decision is hereby made.200 139. The same rationale is applicable to the second argument put forth by the State as regards to land productivity. This argument lodges the idea that indigenous communities are not entitled, under any circumstances, to claim traditional lands the when they are exploited and fully productive, viewing the indigenous issue exclusively from the standpoint of land productivity and agrarian law, something which is insufficient for it fails to address the distinctive characteristics of such peoples. 199 Cf. Case of the Indigenous Community Yakye Axa, supra note 1, para. 149. 200 Cf. Case of the Indigenous Community Yakye Axa, supra note 1, para. 149.