72 and enjoyment of property, springing from the culture, uses, customs, and beliefs of each people, would be tantamount to holding that there is only one way of using and disposing of property, which, in turn, would render protection under Article 21 of the Convention illusory for millions of persons. 121. Consequently, the close ties of indigenous peoples with their traditional lands and the native natural resources thereof, associated with their culture, as well as any incorporeal element deriving therefrom, must be secured under Article 21 of the American Convention. On the matter, the Court, as it has done before, is of the opinion that the term “property” as used in Article 21, includes “material things which can be possessed, as well as any right which may be part of a person’s patrimony; that concept includes all movable and immovable, corporeal and incorporeal elements and any other intangible object capable of having value”.189 122. The Paraguayan Constitution recognizes the existence of indigenous peoples as groups which have preceded the formation of the State, as well as their cultural identity, the relation with their respective habitat and their communal characteristics of their land-tenure system, and further grants them a series of specific rights which serve as basis for the Court to define the scope of Article 21 of the Convention. 123. On the other hand, Article 3 of Law No. 43/89 points out that settlements of indigenous communities are “constituted by a physical area made up of a core of houses, natural resources, crops, plantations, and their environs, linked insofar as possible to their cultural tradition […]” 124. In the instant case, the State does not deny that the members of the Sawhoyamaxa Community have the right to lands of their own; that hunting, fishing, and gathering are essential elements of their culture; that the members of the Sawhoyamaxa Community originate in the Chanawatsan subgroup, which, in turn, belongs to the Enxet people, a traditional inhabitant of the Paraguayan Chaco; and that Santa Elisa and Michi Estates “have been declared part of the traditional habitat [of the members of the Sawhoyamaxa Community] by the INDI.” The point at issue is the effective vesting of the property rights. 125. The State has pointed out that it “does not deny its obligation to restore rights to these peoples,” but the members of the Sawhoyamaxa Community “claim title to a piece of real estate based exclusively on an anthropologic report that, worthy as it is, collides with a property title which has been registered and has been conveyed from one owner to another for a long time.” Likewise, the State fears that, would claim by the Community be granted, “it would be convicted for the ‘sins’ committed during the [C]onquest” (inner quotation marks as used in the original text), and that this could lead to the “absurd situation in which the whole country could be claimed by indigenous peoples, for they are the primitive inhabitants of the strech of territory that is nowadays called Paraguay.” 126. Consequently, in order to address the issues in the instant case, the Court will proceed to examine, in the first place, whether possession of the lands by the indigenous people is a requisite for official recognition of property title thereto. In the 189 Cf. Case of the Indigenous Community Yakye Axa, supra note 1, para 137; Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community, supra note 184, para. 144, and Case of Ivcher-Bronstein. Judgment of February 6, 2001. Series C No. 74, para. 122.