A/HRC/27/52/Add.3 did not have access to state-independent legal or expert advice, as recommended by the Special Rapporteur as part of the necessary measures to address power imbalances between the negotiating parties (ibid.). 51. There is no information available on the internal discussions of the communities during the internal evaluation process. However, the results of these discussions are known, as they were presented to Perupetro in the form of proposals for negotiation during the dialogue stage. During this stage, the indigenous representatives proposed the titling of their lands, as well as the provision of various social services, such as the construction of schools and health clinics, and electricity networks.43 However, these proposals were deemed to be “unrelated to the administrative measures” pertaining to the consultation process, and, in accordance with the Perupetro proposal, it was agreed that these requests should be referred to the competent State institutions “for evaluation within the scope of their competence and a decision on admissibility”.44 In the view of the Special Rapporteur, it is unwise to exclude these subjects from the dialogue process, given that security of land tenure is a subject of central importance in any discussion on extractive projects within the territories in question, and that an environment of trust needs to be created in order to reach lasting agreements (ibid, para. 72). 52. Regarding the proposals which were classified as “related to the administrative measure”, the communities identified their priorities as a labour preference contract, respect for collective rights, concerns over pollution, and revision of any future contract authorizing hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation. These priorities formed the basis for development of the eight agreed points. In the agreements, Perupetro undertook to monitor the project and periodically furnish information to the community on its impacts. For example, with regard to respect for the rights of indigenous peoples, Perupetro undertook to “visit communities in the area of the hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation projects in order to gain first-hand knowledge of the situation of the communities relating to their collective rights”; and, regarding the concerns of the indigenous communities over possible pollution, Perupetro undertook to coordinate with the future contractor “in order to implement community monitoring programmes with the participation of representatives from the community in the area directly affected by the project, in accordance with current regulations”. 53. These agreements concluded the consultation process and it was agreed “to approve the decision on the implementation of the administrative measure: the supreme decree which would approve the signing of the licensing contract for hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation in Block 169”, in preparation for the contract.45 54. There are positive aspects to the consultation procedure related to Block 169, including the joint development of a consultation plan and methodology. However, in the view of the Special Rapporteur, the agreements reached are inadequate for various reasons. They do not contain the fundamentals in order to be considered equitable agreements centred on the rights of indigenous peoples, such as mitigation of the impacts and the effective participation of the indigenous peoples in the development of the project and its eventual benefits (see also chapter VII below). Nor is there any guarantee that the communities affected can revise or participate in the negotiation of the agreement to be signed between the Government and the contractor for oil and gas exploration and exploitation, despite the indigenous representatives having expressed this concern. In that 43 44 45 14 Record of proposals by the indigenous peoples concerning Block 169 unrelated to the administrative measure pertaining to the Prior Consultation process for Block 169 (19 December 2013) p. 1. Ibid., p. 2. Directive No. 003-2014 (13 January 2014). GE.14-07246