A/63/161 69. The State cannot impose or interpret limitations in a way that would jeopardize the essence of the right concerned. Consequently, forcing someone who wishes to take up a public post to take an oath swearing his or her allegiance to a certain religion may amount to coercion by the State and would violate the individual’s freedom of religion or belief. Similarly inconsistent with article 18 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights would be citizenship policies or practices which restrict access to education, medical care, employment, humanitarian assistance or social benefits in order to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to, recant or change their religious beliefs. 70. Measures that discriminate on the basis of religion or belief, or lead to de facto discrimination on such grounds, violate human rights standards. Consequently, it would be contrary to the principle of non-discrimination to restrict citizenship to people with certain religious beliefs or to deny official documents based on the applicant’s religious affiliation. It is also a discriminatory State practice to restrict public posts to members of certain religions or to require candidates to adhere to a particular denomination of the dominant religion in that State. However, the principle of equality may require States to take affirmative action in order to diminish or eliminate conditions which cause or help to perpetuate discrimination. Thus, reserving a certain proportion of seats in legislatures to members of religious minorities might be a case of legitimate differentiation as long as such action is needed to correct discrimination in fact. 71. Measures that limit the freedom of religion or belief must pursue a legitimate aim and be proportionate to the aim. Furthermore, any assessment as to the necessity of a limitation should be based on objective considerations. 72. It would be a legitimate aim were a State to ask for the religious affiliation of its citizens, for example, within the framework of conducting a national census that will allow the State to analyse issues related to freedom of religion or belief. However, the burden of justifying a limitation upon human rights such as freedom of religion or belief or the individual’s right to privacy lies with the State. 73. Laws imposing limitations on the exercise of human rights should not be arbitrary or unreasonable. If the State wishes to mention religious affiliation on official documents, various categories of affiliation, including open-ended ones, need to be provided. It is never sufficient to provide as the only possibility a choice from a limited number of officially recognized religions; there should also be the possibility for the individual to indicate “other religion” or “no religion”, and the possibility not to divulge his or her religious beliefs at all. In general, any indication of one’s religious affiliation should be on a voluntary basis. 74. All limitations should be interpreted in the light and context of the particular right concerned. Taking into account the nature of the positive and negative freedom of religion or belief, applicants for official documents should not be obliged to subscribe to specific statements with regard to their substantive religious beliefs. 75. Governments may argue that they need to be informed of the religious affiliation of their citizens in order to know, for example, under which 22 08-43442