CRPD/C/22/D/17/2013 orders. According to the author, the Anti-Discrimination Act is not a fundamental law that can invalidate other laws of the Northern Territories, such as the Northern Territory Criminal Code, and section 53 of that Act provides for an exception, allowing the performance of a discriminatory act if such an act is authorized by a court. The Committee also notes that the author’s complaints before the Australian Human Rights Commission have not led to any response from the Northern Territory government. The Committee therefore considers that the procedures before the Northern Territory Anti-Discrimination Commissioner and the Australian Human Rights Commission do not give rise to any enforceable remedy for violations of human rights and cannot, therefore, be considered as effective remedies.20 Accordingly, the complaint under article 5 is admissible under article 2 (d) of the Optional Protocol. 7.5 The Committee also notes that the author has not appealed against the Supreme Court’s finding that he was not fit to stand trial (art. 12 of the Convention), that he has not made a complaint of discrimination under section 24 of the Anti-Discrimination Act to request special accommodation (art. 13) and that he has never challenged the custodial supervision orders (art. 14). However, the Committee also recalls that domestic remedies need not be exhausted if they objectively have no prospect of success. 21 In this connection, the Committee notes the author’s argument that, for his appeal to have any chance of success, he would have had to demonstrate that the Court’s decisions were in error, while in fact they were adopted in compliance with the Northern Territory Criminal Code. The Committee notes that this appreciation relies on the law itself, alleging that it violates the author’s rights under the Convention, and it does not correspond to a question of interpretation or application of the legislation by domestic courts. In view thereof, the Committee considers that no additional effective remedies were available to the author and that his claims under articles 12, 13 and 14 of the Convention are also admissible under article 2 (d) of the Optional Protocol. 7.6 Secondly, the Committee notes the State party’s plea of inadmissibility ratione materiae of the author’s claims in relation to his Aboriginal status on the grounds that article 5 of the Convention covers only discrimination on the basis of disability. The author has not commented on this aspect. In this connection, the Committee recalls that all possible grounds of discrimination and their intersections must be taken into account, including indigenous origin.22 Nonetheless, it also notes that the author does not provide arguments to explain the extent to which his Aboriginal origin has had any specific impact on the violations of his rights under the Convention and therefore considers that the author has not sufficiently substantiated this claim for the purpose of admissibility. 7.7 Thirdly, the Committee notes the State party’s argument that all of the author’s allegations – except for some allegations under articles 14 (unrelated to racial discrimination), 15 and 19 of the Convention – should be considered inadmissible for lack of substantiation and lack of merits under article 2 (e) of the Optional Protocol. However, the Committee considers that, for the purposes of admissibility, the author has sufficiently substantiated his claims under articles 5, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 25, 26 and 28 of the Convention. 7.8 Accordingly, and in the absence of other obstacles to admissibility, the Committee declares the communication admissible and proceeds with its consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 8.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information that it has received, in accordance with article 5 of the Optional Protocol and rule 73 (1) of its rules of procedure. 8.2 The Committee notes the author’s submission under article 5 of the Convention that part II.A of the Northern Territory Criminal Code is discriminatory as it applies only to persons with cognitive impairment and that it provides for the indefinite detention of such persons even when they are not found guilty of a criminal offence, while persons without 20 21 22 12 See, mutatis mutandis, D.R. v. Australia (CRPD/C/17/D/14/2013), para. 6.3. Young v. Australia (CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000), para. 9.4. See the Committee’s general comment No. 6 (2018) on equality and non-discrimination, para. 21.