CAT/C/42/D/261/2005 Page 14 complainant clearly falls under article 16 of the Convention, which requires criminal redress, civil and administrative remedies alone20 would not have provided sufficient redress. Finally, criminal proceedings in the Republic of Serbia are generally quicker and more efficient than civil proceedings. 5.3 The complainant further submitted that the authorities are bound ex officio to investigate and punish ill treatment when they have knowledge of it. Both under the CPL and under its successor, the CPC, public prosecutors are obliged to take all steps and to adopt all necessary measures in order to uncover relevant evidence and investigate a case thoroughly. It is irrelevant whether the complainant initiated separate civil proceedings, since the State party is obliged to investigate and to prosecute, as the evidence clearly indicated there had been an abuse. 5.4 The complainant challenged the State party’s claim that the law in force at the relevant time limited the public prosecutor’s powers in the conduct of criminal proceedings, particularly regarding the police. The public prosecutor was and is empowered with specific competences and powers throughout the entire criminal procedure. He could take over prosecution from the injured party as the prosecutor where, as in the present case, the criminal offences involved are prosecuted ex officio. The complainant submitted that under article 155 of the CPL, the public prosecutor had power to instruct both the police and the investigating judge, whereas under article 239 of the CPC, the public prosecutor’s power extends only to the investigating judge in this respect. Both laws empower the investigating judge to take actions on his own motion and upon the motion of the public prosecutor. Proper examination of the allegations of mistreatment at the hands of the police would mean, inter alia, ordering the identification of the police officers dressed in civilian clothes through conducting an identity parade for the victim. Various State party bodies could have ordered the police to provide this information through the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the investigating judge or the public prosecutor. The complainant concluded that any differences between the CPC and the CPL have no bearing on the arguments in the present case, especially concerning the State party’s obligations under articles 12, 13 and 14 of the Convention. 5.5 The complainant questioned the State party’s assertion that during 2000 and 2001 the only independent authority with the powers to regulate police conduct was the Internal Affairs Control Section. The fundamental principle of the division of powers vests the judiciary with this authority. 5.6 The complainant noted the State party’s confirmation that there were plainclothes officers on duty and its argument that they used only police truncheons in a legal fashion (no use of fists, kicking, etc.). 21 This assertion does not correspond to the testimonial evidence of abuse corroborated by medical reports and photographs. At the same time, no competent state authority revealed the identity of these plainclothes officers to the complainant, thus absolutely and definitively preventing him from exercising his right to take over the prosecution and ultimately bringing the perpetrators to justice. Even if the identity of the plainclothes officers was not contained in the report, there were numerous ways through which the authorities could have requested this information. 20 21 See paragraphs 4.9 and 4.10. See paragraph 4.7 above.