CCPR/C/130/D/2526/2015 Annex I Individual opinion of Committee member Furuya Shuichi, partially joined by Committee members David Moore and Hélène Tigroudja (dissenting) 1. Mr. Furuya and Mr. Moore are unable to concur with the view adopted by the Committee that the author’s claim of violation of article 14 (3) (d) and (e) concerning his trial in absentia is inadmissible (para. 6.6), and Mr. Furuya and Ms. Tigroudja disagree with its conclusion that the resolution of Parliament which describes the author and his co-defendants as organizers and perpetrators of the tragic events in Osh and Jalalabad of May and June 2010 does not constitute a violation of article 14 (2) (para. 7.2). Trial in absentia 2. According to article 14 (3) (d) of the Covenant, everyone is entitled to be tried in his presence and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance. On the other hand, as the present Views point out, criminal proceedings in the absence of the accused may in some circumstances be permissible in the interest of the proper administration of justice, that is, when the accused person, although informed of the proceedings sufficiently in advance, declines to exercise their right to be present. However, it is important to note that a trial in the presence of the accused is the principle, while a trial in absentia is the exception. 3. Therefore, the Committee has emphasized that a trial in absentia is compatible with article 14 only when the accused was summoned in a timely manner and informed of the proceedings against him. This is because the effective exercise of the rights under article 14 presupposes that the necessary steps should be taken to inform the accused beforehand about the proceedings against him (art. 14 (3) (a)). Judgment in absentia requires that, notwithstanding the absence of the accused, all due notification has been made to inform him of the date and place of his trial and to request his attendance. Otherwise, the accused is not given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence (art. 14 (3) (b)) and cannot defend himself through legal assistance of his own choosing (art. 14 (3) (d)), nor does he have the opportunity to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf (art. 14 (3) (e)). 4. Since a trial in absentia is the exception to article 14 (3) (d), it is incumbent upon a State party to demonstrate whether it has taken necessary steps to notify the accused of the legal proceedings. The Committee has acknowledged that there must be certain limits to the efforts that can reasonably be expected by the competent authorities with a view to establishing contact with the accused. However, even if there are certain difficulties in contacting the accused, the State party is still obliged to demonstrate that it has actually made sufficiently proactive efforts to inform the accused person of the criminal charges and to notify him or her about the date and place of the criminal proceedings. 5. In the present case, however, the author alleged that the State party had not taken any measures to contact him before the criminal proceedings commenced, and the State party did not rebut this allegation. In fact, the State party has provided no information to the Committee with regard to the concrete steps it took to inform the author of the charges against him or to notify him of the court proceedings. 6. Under these circumstances, Mr. Furuya and Mr. Moore have to conclude that the author’s claim is admissible and the trial that the State party commenced without the presence of the author constitutes a violation of his rights under article 14 (3) (d). Parliamentary resolution 7. According to the Committee’s general comment No. 32 (2007), the presumption of innocence under article 14 (2) requires that a person accused of a criminal act must be treated in accordance with this principle. In this respect, the obligation deriving from the presumption of innocence goes beyond the conduct of the concerned judge and prosecutor during the criminal proceedings. In a broader social context, a suspect and accused shall be 8