CCPR/C/130/D/2526/2015 6.2 The Committee has ascertained, as required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol, that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 6.3 The Committee notes the author’s claim that the State party violated his rights under article 17 (1) of the Covenant because his reputation had been discredited as he had been labelled a criminal and his family life had been affected. The Committee observes, however, that according to the information available, these claims do not appear to have been raised in the domestic proceedings. This part of the communication, raising issues under article 17 (1) of the Covenant, is accordingly declared inadmissible for failure to exhaust all domestic remedies in accordance with article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol. 6.4 The Committee notes the claim by the author that he has exhausted the available effective domestic remedies, which was confirmed by the State party. Accordingly, the Committee considers that the requirements of article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol have been met with regard to his remaining claims. 6.5 The Committee notes that the author claims a violation of his rights under article 2 (1) of the Covenant. It recalls its jurisprudence to the effect that the provisions of article 2 of the Covenant, which lay down general obligations for States parties, cannot, in and of themselves, give rise to a claim in a communication under the Optional Protocol. 5 The Committee therefore considers that this part of the communication is inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 6.6 The Committee notes the author’s claim that he was not notified about his trial and was sentenced in absentia, which violated his rights to be tried in his presence and to examine witnesses against him as provided for in article 14 (3) (d) and (e) of the Covenant. The Committee recalls that under article 14 (3), everyone is entitled to be tried in his or her presence and to defend himself or herself in person or through legal assistance. This provision and other requirements of due process enshrined in article 14 cannot be construed as invariably rendering proceedings in absentia impermissible, irrespective of the reasons for the accused person’s absence.6 Indeed, proceedings in absentia may in some circumstances be permissible in the interest of the proper administration of justice: for example, when the accused person, although informed of the proceedings sufficiently in advance, declines to exercise his or her right to be present. The Committee has held in the past that a trial in absentia is compatible with article 14 only when the accused has been summoned in a timely manner and informed of the proceedings against him or her.7 In order for the State party to comply with the requirements of a fair trial when trying a person in absentia, it must show that these principles were respected.8 6.7 The Committee acknowledges, however, that there must be certain limits to the efforts that can reasonably be expected of the competent authorities with a view to establishing contact with the accused.9 The State party has not denied that the author was tried in absentia on the basis of domestic law which allows for in absentia trials if defendants are outside of Kyrgyzstan and avoid appearing in court. The Committee notes the author’s submission that he left Kyrgyzstan with his family in mid-June 2010 (according to the author, 25 days after the criminal investigation was opened on 19 May 2010), and that he was not informed about the trial and learned of the verdict only through the mass media. However, the Committee observes that the author was legally represented and that no information in the file suggests that his counsel had no contact with him throughout the criminal process. In these 5 6 7 8 9 6 See, for example, Human Rights Committee, M.G.B. and S.P. v. Trinidad and Tobago, communication No. 268/1987, para. 6.2; Bazarov v. Belarus (CCPR/C/111/D/1934/2010), para. 6.3; A.P. v. Ukraine (CCPR/C/105/D/1834/2008), para. 8.5; and Khudayberdiev v. Kyrgyzstan (CCPR/C/127/D/2522/2015), para. 9.4. Human Rights Committee, Mbenge v. Zaire, communication No. 16/1977, para. 14.1; and Khudayberdiev v. Kyrgyzstan, para. 9.5. Ibid. Human Rights Committee, Maleki v. Italy, communication No. 699/1996, para. 9.3; and Khudayberdiev v. Kyrgyzstan, para. 9.5. Salikh v. Uzbekistan (CCPR/C/95/D/1382/2005), para. 9.5; and Khudayberdiev v. Kyrgyzstan, para. 9.6.