CRPD/C/20/D/23/2014 party violated its obligations under domestic law15 and under the Convention to carry out an effective investigation and prosecute the perpetrators. 5.4 The author also refers to the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights in Greco v. Argentina, where it stated that: “While it is the responsibility of the petitioner in a given instance to ensure that the State is placed on proper notice of an alleged violation of the Convention, so as to have an adequate opportunity to resolve the complaint within its own legal system, it is the State that is obliged to advance the investigation of any crime which may be prosecuted de officio. In such cases, it can only be demanded that the petitioner exhaust domestic remedies where the State concerned investigates the facts alleged with due diligence and proceeds to punish any persons found responsible in accordance with its duties under both domestic law and the Convention.”16 5.5 The author argues that in the case of crimes of public action, and even in those which may be perpetrated by a private actor, it is not valid to request the exhaustion of domestic remedies by the victim because the State party has a duty to maintain public order and to set the criminal law system for effective investigation of these crimes. The author refers to additional jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights17 according to which the obligation to investigate “must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government. In other words, the obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish the persons liable for human rights violations is a non-delegable duty of the State.” The author submits that, in his case, the State party has failed to conduct an effective investigation and prosecution. Rather, it discontinued the investigation before identifying the perpetrators, as domestic jurisdictions usually do in similar cases. 5.6 As regards the State party’s statement that investigations are ongoing to bring the author’s attackers to justice, the author submits that there is no sign of any concrete action taken, or of any result of the investigative process referred to. The author has never been contacted and he has never received any information about the procedures and investigations allegedly being carried out. 5.7 Regarding the State party’s argument that the author should have submitted a human rights petition before Tanzanian courts under the Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act, the author submits that such procedure is cumbersome and extremely prolonged. He refers to the jurisprudence of human rights bodies, according to which there is no need to exhaust unduly prolonged remedies which by their very nature are ineffective.18 He submits that even if no hard and fast rule exists to establish whether remedies are unduly prolonged, human rights bodies usually consider the conduct of the State concerned and the complexity of the case to determine whether the length of time is reasonable.19 The author submits that applicants can rely on this rule when, as in his case, investigations have been pending for years without any evidence of progress or when judicial proceedings have dragged on for years, or when remedies have been used as “delaying instruments”.20 5.8 The author also refers to the petition submitted on 20 March 2009 to the High Court of Tanzania by persons with albinism who have been victims of acts of violence, as “Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 15 of 2009”, under the Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act. According to section 4 of the Act, an aggrieved person can apply to the High Court for remedies, and the bench in charge of determining the merits of the 15 16 17 18 19 20 6 The author refers to sect. 90 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act. See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights report No. 72/01, case 11.804, para. 51. The author refers to Sequeira Mangas v. Nicaragua, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights report No. 52/97, case 11.218, para. 96. The author refers to Vicente et al. v. Colombia (CCPR/C/60/D/612/1995), and to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Association of Victims of Post-Electoral Violence and INTERIGHTS v. Cameroon (communication No. 272/03), judgment of 25 November 2009. The author refers to the European Court of Human Rights, Todorov v. Bulgaria (application No. 39832/98), judgment of 18 January 2005, para. 45. The author refers to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, “Las Dos Erres” Massacre v. Guatemala (preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs), judgment of 24 November 2009.