A/HRC/49/46 inability to ensure the use of English as a medium of instruction in tertiary education; documents and public notices issued in French without English translations; the sending of francophone magistrates, who often do not understand the English-based common law system, to English-speaking areas; the underrepresentation and political representation of the minority (in March 2017, only 1 of the 36 government ministers who controlled departmental budgets was an anglophone); and protests by lawyers, subsequently joined by teachers and others, over a 2016 law that was not translated into English, and thus not did not comply with the bilingual nature of the State. 52. Lastly, the uprising in the southern region of Thailand also shares common threads of exclusion, discrimination and inequalities of a minority, this time along ethnic, religious and linguistic lines. Thailand is the home of a rather large and territorially concentrated minority, that is, some 5 million to 6 million Malay-speaking Muslims, who represent about 80 per cent of the population in the south, bordering Malaysia, but less than 3 per cent of the country’s total population. Violence emerged in the early and mid-twentieth century in reaction to national policies in education promoting the Thai language and Buddhism to the detriment of the language, religion and culture of the Malay-Muslim minority. This also explains the choice of some of the targets of the insurgents, which may at first seem surprising: since 2004, for example, more than 4,000 people have been killed, 120 public schools have been burned down and about 100 teachers have been murdered by ethnic Malay insurgents. The targeting of schools and teachers in particular can be seen as an attack on the symbols of the majority Thai language and culture and as the grievances of exclusion, discrimination and inequalities against Thai central government authorities. Even in the southern region where they are concentrated and form most of the population, Malay Muslims have poorer academic results and are vastly underrepresented in almost all fields of employment involving the State. As with previous examples, long-standing grievances are the main issues of contention in the conflict, including with regard to: a public education system and language of instruction that do not equally serve the Malay-speaking minority; a strong sense of exclusion and discrimination in employment; and the inability to use the local form of the Malay language for public service purposes. 53. Some of the more common indicators of threats to peace and stability, and drivers of most contemporary conflicts, include human rights violations, such as State-sponsored or tolerated hate speech or incitement to violence targeting minorities, the dispossession of land and other resources occupied or used by minorities (and indigenous peoples), the imposition of the religion or language of the majority population, the underrepresentation or exclusion of minorities in terms of political participation and representation, and their disproportionate levels of impoverishment or unequal and discriminatory access to socioeconomic goods and services, including to public education appropriate for and reflective of minority and indigenous communities. 54. The likelihood of these and other potential drivers of conflicts eventually leading to conflicts can be increased or diminished by push and pull factors, 41 including: (a) The presence of significant concentrations or proportions of minority populations as opposed to a highly and thinly dispersed population; (b) indigenous; Whether the minority populations are long-established national minorities or (c) The location of minority populations near borders or more inaccessible regions, particularly if there are cross-border ethnic, religious or linguistic affinities with a neighbouring State or region; (d) Whether the areas of grievances around exclusion, discrimination and inequalities are linked to claims of the reduction or elimination of previously existing rights for minorities, particularly in education and language; 41 See Fernand de Varennes, “Recurrent challenges to the implementation of intrastate peace agreements: the resistance of state authorities”, New Balkan Politics, No. 7/8 (2004). 13