A/HRC/10/8/Add.3 page 18 a religion. She highlights the fact that these aspects of the right to freedom of religion or belief have an absolute character and are not subject to any limitation whatsoever. Mr. Amor already stressed in an annual report to the Commission on Human Rights (E/CN.4/1997/91, para. 99) that “it is not the business of the State or any other group or community to act as the guardian of people’s consciences and encourage, impose or censure any religious belief or conviction”. 52. The Special Rapporteur would also like to refer to her report to the 60th session of the General Assembly (A/60/399, paras. 40-68), in which she discussed the question of conversion in greater detail. She notes that international human rights law clearly prohibits coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief, including the use or threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to their religious beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief or to convert. Similarly, a general prohibition of conversion by a State necessarily enters into conflict with applicable international standards. 5. Religion-based personal laws 53. Conversions are also addressed in some religion-based personal laws and some provisions may lead to discrimination, for example in matters of succession. Conversion to another religion by one spouse is a ground for divorce in some areas of personal law. 54. There is concern amongst women’s rights activists regarding several discriminatory aspects, especially on the basis of gender, within personal laws governing each religious community. Women’s groups recognise that religious minorities, particularly members of the Muslim community, have been opposed to the enactment of a uniform civil code mainly because according to religious Muslim leaders this would infringe upon their religious freedom and might be biased in favour of the majority religion. Their arguments are nonetheless challenged by many Muslims as well. The debate on upholding personal laws became heated after the Shah Bano judgement, where the Supreme Court of India confirmed that Muslims were subject to the secular criminal law of maintenance in the Criminal Procedure Code 1973.22 The Supreme Court deprecated Muslim personal law for denying maintenance to a destitute woman by her former husband three months after their divorce. This judgement was not well-received by some Muslim groups and subsequently the Indian Parliament passed the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986, thus diluting the effect of the Supreme Court judgement. This Act gives divorced Muslim women the right to “a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid to her within the iddat23 period by her former husband”. 55. The All India Muslim Personal Law Board, constituted in 1972, led the agitation against the Shah Bano judgement and arguably arrogated to itself the authority to speak on behalf of all Muslims on matters of personal law. The Board also opposed a subsequent bill on compulsory 22 Supreme Court of India, Mohammad Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum and others, judgement of 23 April 1985. 23 For a definition of “iddat” see section 2 (b) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986.