somewhat more limited scope, because it applies to employment and occupation in the public sector only. Furthermore, although the Goods and Services Directive applies to both public and private sector, it is limited to access to and supply of goods and services; for example, it explicitly excludes the content of media and advertising, as well as education from its scope.155 Under all three Directives, direct discrimination takes place where one person is treated ‘less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation’156 on grounds specifically prohibited by the respective Directives. Indirect discrimination occurs where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin, sex, religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons.157 Under the Race and Employment Directives, indirect discrimination may, however, be justified if a measure had a legitimate aim, to be achieved by appropriate and necessary means. For example, differences in treatment in connection with age may be justified on the basis of legitimate employment policy, labour market and vocational training objectives.158 The Goods and Services Directive introduces the similar concept of objective justification without limiting it to cases of indirect discrimination.159 The preamble of the Goods and Services Directive refers, for example, to single-sex shelters aimed to protect victims of sex-related violence.160 In addition, the Directives prohibit harassment – unwanted conduct related to one of the prohibited grounds of discrimination with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person and of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment. The Directives permit member states to define the concept of harassment, taking into consideration the context supplied by Article 2(3). Furthermore, any instruction to discriminate on the grounds listed in the Directives is deemed to be discrimination. The Directives, however, contain several exceptions. For example, Article 4 of the Race Directive and Article 4(1) of the Employment Directive stipulate that differential treatment based on a characteristic related to racial or ethnic origin, age, disability, religion or belief or sexual orientation would not be considered discriminatory if by reason of the nature of the particular occupational activities concerned or of the context in which they are carried out, such a characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and the requirement is proportionate.161 As to the Goods and Services Directive, prior to 21 December 2007, the Directive allowed member states to ‘permit proportionate differences in individuals’ premiums 16 and benefits where the use of sex is a determining factor in the assessment of risk based on relevant and accurate actuarial and statistical data’.162 However, the use of sex as a factor in the calculation of premiums for the purposes of insurance and related financial services is precluded in all contracts concluded after 21 December 2007.163 Thus, there are a number of hedges in all three Directives capable of limiting the scope of their application. On the positive side, all three Directives specify that, to ensure full equality in practice, member states would not be precluded from maintaining or adopting positive action to prevent or compensate for disadvantages entailed by non-discrimination.164 In addition, the Directives clarify that the provisions of these instruments are minimum standards and member states are free to maintain higher standards of protection;165 moreover, the implementation of the Directives may not reduce the level of protection that was already afforded under national laws.166 It is hoped that the exceptions in Articles 4 in each of the Equality Directives will not detract from their protective scope, but this will largely depend on the ECJ’s reading of the instruments. The following section reviews the ECJ’s jurisprudence based on these Directives. Race Directive: ethnic and racial discrimination Case study: Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v Firma Feryn NV (Feryn) The ECJ has interpreted the scope of the Race Directive only once. In Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v Firma Feryn NV (Feryn),167 the ECJ dealt with the concept of direct discrimination. The case concerned public statements by one of the directors of Feryn who claimed that his firm, which specialized in the sale and installation of doors, would not recruit persons of Moroccan origin, because some customers do not want them in their private homes. The Belgian Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism brought proceedings against Feryn before national courts. The national court stayed the proceedings and asked the ECJ to provide guidance on whether public statements by an employer declaring that it would not recruit employees of a certain ethnic origin constitute direct discrimination under the Race Directive. One of the distinct features of the case is a lack of an identifiable victim in the case. The UK and Ireland argued, therefore, that no claim can be made under the Race Directive.168 The ECJ, however, disagreed and held that the existence of direct discrimination was not dependent MINORITY GROUPS AND LITIGATION: A REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL JURISPRUDENCE