CCPR/C/123/D/2747/2016 hostility on the part of a predominant religious community. A violation of article 26 may result from the discriminatory effect of a rule or measure that is apparently neutral or lacking any intention to discriminate. 23 Yet, not every differentiation based on the grounds listed in article 26 amounts to discrimination, as long as it is based on reasonable and objective criteria, 24 in pursuit of an aim that is legitimate under the Covenant. 25 The Committee must therefore decide whether the differential treatment of the author, who wears the full Islamic veil, with regard to other forms of face covering authorized under the exceptions established by article 2 of Act No. 2010-1192 meets the criteria of reasonableness, objectivity and legitimacy of the aim. 8.15 The Committee notes that the State party has provided no explanation why the blanket prohibition on the author’s veil is reasonable or justified, in contrast to the exceptions allowable under the Act. 26 The Committee further notes that the blanket ban on the full-face veil introduced by the Act appears to be based on the assumption that the full veil is inherently discriminatory and that women who wear it are forced to do so. While acknowledging that some women may be subject to family or social pressures to cover their faces, the Committee observes that the wearing of the full veil may also be a choice — or even a means of staking a claim — based on religious belief, as in the author’s case.27 The Committee further considers that the prohibition, rather than protecting fully veiled women, could have the opposite effect of confining them to their homes, impeding their access to public services and exposing them to abuse and marginalization. Indeed, the Committee has previously stated its concern that the Act’s ban on face coverings in public places infringes the freedom to express one’s religion or belief, has a disproportionate impact on the members of specific religions and on girls, and that the Act’s effect on certain groups’ feeling of exclusion and marginalization could run counter to the intended goals. 28 The Committee further notes that a separate provision of the Act, article 225-4-10 of the Criminal Code, criminalizes the serious offence of forcing an individual to conceal the face, and thus specifically addresses that stated concern. 8.16 Finally, although the State party contends that the sanctions imposed on women who decide to wear the full veil in public are “measured”, the Committee notes that the penalties have a criminal nature and have been applied against some women, including the author, on multiple occasions. Such sanctions necessarily negatively impact the author’s right to manifest her religion through wearing the veil and potentially other rights. 8.17 In the light of the foregoing, the Committee considers that the criminal ban introduced by article 1 of Act No. 2010-1192 disproportionately affects the author as a Muslim woman who chooses to wear the full-face veil, and introduces a distinction between her and other persons who may legally cover their face in public that is not necessary and proportionate to a legitimate interest, and is therefore unreasonable. The Committee hence concludes that this provision and its application to the author constitutes a form of intersectional discrimination based on gender and religion, in violation of article 26 of the Covenant. 9. The Committee, acting under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, is of the view that the State party has violated the author’s rights under articles 18 and 26 of the Covenant. 10. In accordance with article 2 (3) (a) of the Covenant, the State party is under an obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy. This requires it to make full reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated. In the present case, the 23 24 25 26 27 28 See Althammer et al. v. Austria (CCPR/C/78/D/998/2001), para. 10.2. See, for example, Broeks v. Netherlands (CCPR/C/29/D/172/1984), para. 13; and Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands (CCPR/C/29/D/182/1984), para. 13. See O’Neill and Quinn v. Ireland (CCPR/C/87/D/1314/2004), para. 8.3. See, in this regard, C v. Australia (CCPR/C/119/D/2216/2012), para. 8.6. Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights found, in S.A.S. v. France (para. 119), that “a State Party cannot invoke gender equality in order to ban a practice that is defended by women — such as the applicant — in the context of the exercise of the rights enshrined in those provisions, unless it were to be understood that individuals could be protected on that basis from the exercise of their own fundamental rights and freedoms.” CCPR/C/FRA/CO/5, para. 22. 13