"adequate time" requires an assessment of the individual circumstances of each
case. The author also contends that ha was unable to secure the attendance of
witnesses on his behalf. The Committee notes, however, that the material
before it does not reveal that either counsel or the author complained to the
trial judge that the time or facilities were inadequate. The Committee
therefore finds no violation of article 14, paragraph 3 (b) and (e).
6.6 Concerning the adequacy of the author's legal representation, both on
trial and on appeal, the Committee recalls that it is axiomatic that legal
assistance be made available to individuals facing a capital sentence. In the
present case, it is uncontested that the author instructed his lawyer to raise
objections to the confessional evidence, as he claimed this was obtained
through maltreatment; this was not done. This failure had a clear incidence
on the conduct of the appeal; the written judgement of the Court of Appeal of
13 June 1987 emphasizes that no objections were raised by the defence in
respect of the confessional evidence. Furthermore, although the author had
Specifically indicated that he wished to be present during the hearing of the
appeal, he was not only absent when the appeal was heard but, moreover, could
not instruct his representative for the appeal, despite his wish to do so.
Taking into account the combined effect of the above-mentioned circumstances,
and bearing in mind that this is a case involving the death penalty, the
Committee considers that the State party should have allowed the author to
instruct his lawyer for the appeal, or to represent himself at the appeal
proceedings. To the extent that the author was denied effective
representation in the judicial proceedings and in particular as far as his
appeal is concerned, the requirements of article 14, paragraph 3 (d), have not
been met.
6.7 As to the claim under article 14, paragraph 3 (g), the Committee notes
that the wording of this provision - i.e. that no one shall "be compelled to
testify against himself or to confess guilt" - must be understood in terms of
the absence of any pressure from the investigating authorities on the accused,
with a view to obtaining a confession of guilt. In the present case, the
author's claim that he was beaten during interrogation and forced to sign a
blank confession statement has not been contested by the State party. It
remains the Committee's duty to ascertain whether the author has sufficiently
substantiated his allegation, notwithstanding the State party's failure to
address it. After careful consideration of the material before it, the
Committee is unable to determine that the investigating officers used force to
compel Mr. Campbell to confess his guilt, in violation of article 14,
paragraph 3 (g), or that the judge erred in admitting the confessional
evidence put forth by the prosecution,
6.8 With respect to the claim of "undue delay" in the proceedings against the
author, the Committee does not consider that a delay of 10 months between
conviction and the dismissal of the appeal, resulted in "undue delay(s)"
within the meaning of article 14, paragraph 3 (c), of the Covenant. The
Committee is further unable to conclude that the conduct of the appeal
jeopardized the author's chances of an effective appeal to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, in violation of article 14, paragraph 5. In
this context, the Committee notes that the Court of Appeal produced a written
judgement within one month after dismissing the appeal; it also lacks evidence
that such delays as were experienced by counsel in obtaining a copy of the
written judgement must be attributed to the State party.
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