A/HRC/43/48/Add.2 withdrawn.36 Many Muslim women whose religious beliefs or families require them to wear a veil in public found themselves forced to stay home. Even though the ban is no longer in effect, many choose not to wear the veil while some continue to be harassed based on their religious dress codes. 51. The Special Rapporteur would like to point to the fact that restrictions imposed on religious dress codes may constitute a violation of freedom of religion, as the Human Rights Committee explains in paragraph 4 of its general comment No. 22 that the observance and practice of religion or belief may include not only ceremonial acts but also such customs as the wearing of distinctive clothing or head coverings. Article 18 (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights clearly provides that freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. Such limitations must further not have a discriminatory intent or effect. 52. Members of LGBT+ communities also reported that religious teaching was a significant factor in the marginalization of LGBT+ communities and led to deep personal struggles for those who attempted to reconcile their religious identity with their sexuality. Often, the perspectives of LGBT+ persons and women are excluded from interreligious dialogues and processes of reconciliation. Efforts towards reconciliation, refracted through ethnic and religious lenses, without considering gendered impacts, are not inclusive. 53. The Special Rapporteur received reports that the Government refuses to legally acknowledge the order of Bhikkhuni nuns. Bhikkhunis are not permitted to have their ordination name on their national identity card, whereas Bhikkhus (males) are allowed to do so. IV. Root causes of religious intolerance and tensions in Sri Lanka 54. The Special Rapporteur notes the importance of analysing and identifying the root causes of religious intolerance and tensions that lead to the violation of freedom of religion or belief in order to better address these challenges. A. Politicization of ethnic and religious identity 55. In most of the conversations the Special Rapporteur had during his visit, people often identified themselves as Muslim, Sinhalese or Tamil. Otherwise, they identified themselves as Buddhist, Christian, Hindu or Muslim. Indicating one’s identity by ethnicity or by religion seems also to imply the marking of a territory whether by a street, a plot of land, a village, a town or a province and, in some cases, perhaps it is also an identification of social status or political affiliation. A rise in identity-based perspectives within various political parties further reinforces ethno-religious fragmentation.37 56. While there is recognition that the Sri Lankan national identity represents some diversity, including ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity, those who are members of a religious community that does not constitute one of the four main recognized religions in Sri Lanka face discrimination. Even among those who are recognized, the communities who are outnumbered by others in different areas claim that they are marginalized or at risk of being “colonized” by the religious or ethnic majority. Similarly, the majority would argue that the “invasion” of new religious communities in certain areas is not welcomed as they do not fit, or they use the pretext that the new religious groups have undermined religious harmony in certain areas or hurt religious feelings of the majority people or that they try to convert others unethically. 57. Although the Constitution frames freedom of religion or belief as a fundamental human right, the collective dimension of the right appears to be more emphasized in practice than the individual rights dimension, especially in the societal understanding of the 36 37 Ibid. Select Committee of Parliament, “Interim report”, para. 2.3. 11