A/HRC/33/42/Add.1 V. Emblematic cases A. Belo Monte 36. The Special Rapporteur visited the Juruna people on the Xingu River who are affected by the Belo Monte dam. Since its outset almost 30 years ago, the project has been shrouded in controversy and resisted by the indigenous peoples whose lives it impacts. In 2009, the previous mandate holder noted that indigenous groups and non-governmental organizations had complained that the Belo Monte project was being carried out without adequate mitigation measures and consultations with the affected indigenous communities.7 In his observations on this case, he highlighted the need for concerted efforts to carry out adequate consultations with indigenous peoples and to endeavour to reach consensus with them on all aspects of projects affecting them. He also stressed that the minimum steps to be taken should include the mitigation and land demarcation measures proposed by FUNAI.8 37. A series of prominent national court cases were filed by the Public Prosecutor’s Office. However, the judiciary’s invocation of the security suspension mechanism prevented legal challenges by indigenous peoples and allowed the projects to proceed without compliance with the State duty to consult to seek the free, prior and informed consent of the affected peoples. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issued precautionary measures in 2011,9 in which it addressed the lack of adequate prior consultation, the inaccessibility of impact assessments and the urgent need to protect indigenous peoples’ life and physical integrity. Despite this, governmental authorizations were issued for the project to proceed. 38. Notably, in November 2015, the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA) granted Norte Energia S.A. an operating licence, notwithstanding documented reports by FUNAI of non-compliance with the conditions stipulated in the 2010 request.10 Similar advice from the Public Prosecutor’s Office not to approve the project until the necessary mitigation measures were in place was ignored. 39. At the time of the Special Rapporteur’s visit in March 2016, construction of the dam had been completed and the reservoirs were being filled. As foreseen by the affected indigenous peoples, the dam has resulted in their loss of control over their lands, rivers and resources. Although the dam itself is not located within demarcated indigenous lands, it directly affects the indigenous peoples in the surrounding 11 indigenous lands. 40. During her visit to the area, the Special Rapporteur was informed of the lack of meaningful and culturally appropriate information and consultations and the successful attempts to divide the communities. Community members and their representatives rejected the notion that the Government or Norte Energia had adequately consulted them or informed them of the potential impacts during any of the phases of the project. They said that public hearings on the project were grossly inadequate compared with the standard of consultation provided for in ILO Convention No. 169 and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and explained that no efforts had been made to obtain 7 8 9 10 10 See A/HRC/12/34/Add.2, para. 57. See A/HRC/15/37/Add.1, para. 53. See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, PM 382/10 (2011). See FUNAI, Report No. 233/2015/CGLIC/FUNAI-MJ (Brasilia, 23 September 2015); attachment to official letter 410 of 24 September 2015; and IBAMA, Technical report No. 02001.003622/2015-08 (23 September 2015)